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2The Effects of Extrinsic Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation: 
Reinforcement Theory or Cognitive Evaluation Theory
Intrinsically motivated behaviors are those for which there is 
no apparent reward except the activity itself. Such rewards are 
mediated within the individual. Rather than bringing about external 
rewards, intrinsically motivated behaviors bring about internal states 
that the individual finds rewarding (Deci, 1975a).
A similar phenomenon has been observed in animal studies. Berlyne 
(:1950, 1955) found that rats will perform an operant task for the 
reward of novel stimulation. He postulated a “curiosity" or "explora­
tory" drive that may be equated with intrinsically motivated behavior. 
Harlow, Harlow, and Meyer (.1950) observed monkeys working on a puzzle 
apparatus for no apparent reward and called this intrinsically moti­
vated behavior a "manipulation drive".
Theorists such as Hebb (.1955), Berlyne (.1963, 1966) and Helson 
(196^) have also attempted to explain such behaviors. Though each 
theory is somewhat different, the general notion is 'that organisms 
seek to maintain an optimal level of arousal or incongruity. Thus, 
an intrinsically motivated activity is performed to increase or decrease 
the level of stimulation. Deci (1975a), however, disagrees with the 
theories of maintenance of optimal arousal. He asserts that individuals 
seek out situations that provide a reasonable challenge for the purpose 
of overcoming this challenge. Having overcome the challenge the 
individual will seek new challenging situations.
3Intrinsic motivation may "be viewed through an attributional 
analysis. Attribution theory isn’t concerned with the objective 
causes of behavior, but with the individual’s perception of causality 
(Bern, 1967; Heider, 1958, Jones and Davis, 1965; Kelley, 1967)* 
According to the attribution view a person will be more likely to 
perceive himself as extrinsically motivated if he is presented with 
a salient reward for performance of an activity. Deci (19715 1972a, 
1975a) has developed a cognitive theory concerning the effects of 
extrinsic rewards on intrinsic motivation. The underlying assumptions 
of the theory are based on attribution theory.
In contrast, the content of the theory builds on notions set 
forth by DeCharms (1968). DeCharms has stated that when a person 
perceives himself to be the locus of causality for his own behavior 
he will consider himself to be intrinsically motivated. Satisfaction 
is derived from an activity which is perceived as intrinsically moti- 
vated because of a person’s need to feel a sense of personal causation 
in his actions. Due to this need, presentation of extrinsic rewards 
for intrinsically motivated behavior will act to decrease intrinsic 
motivation. Extrinsic rewards cause a person to lose his feelings of 
personal causality and make him feel like a pawn controlled by the 
rewards.
These cognitive approaches are in opposition to a reinforce­
ment position regarding the relationship between extrinsic rewards 
and intrinsically motivated behavior. Reinforcement theory (Kazdin.
& Bootzin, 1972) places prime emphasis on extrinsic factors in the
kcausation and explanation of behavior. Thus, any behavior explained 
as intrinsically motivated by a cognitive theorist will tend to be 
cited as externally controlled by a reinforcement theorist.
Deci's cognitive evaluation theory (.1971, 1972a, 1975a) disputes 
the assertions made by reinforcement theory concerning extrinsic 
rewards and intrinsic motivation. The theory is a cognitive theory, 
thus it is built around the assumption that individuals make choices 
about how to perform based on processing information received from the 
environment, from memory, and from personal feelings. This framework 
may be contrasted with those reinforcement theories that typically 
regard human beings as mechanisms whose behavior is determined by 
reinforcement histories and contingencies in the present environment 
(e.g., Skinner, 1975).
Cognitive evaluation theory (Deci, 1971, 1972a, 1975a) states 
first that intrinsic motivation can be affected by a change in per­
ceived locus of causality from internal to external. Such changes cause 
a decrease in intrinsic motivation. This situation typically occurs 
when one receives an extrinsic reward for an intrinsically motivated 
activity. A second process by which intrinsic motivation can be 
affected is a change in feelings of competence and self-determination.
If these feelings are enhanced intrinsic motivation will increase.
With their diminution intrinsic motivation will decrease. A third 
proposition is that every reward has two aspects, a controlling aspect 
and an informational aspect. The relative salience of the two aspects 
determines which process will be operative. If the control aspect is 
more salient changes are initiated in perceived locus of causality to 
external. If the information aspect is more salient changes in feelings
5of competence and self-determination will be initiated. The infor­
mation aspects may be positive or negative, positive leading to 
increases and negative leading to decreases in feelings of competence 
and self-determination. The result is an increase or decrease in 
intrinsic motivation.
Reasoning from these theoretical statements leads to specific
x
predictions and prescriptions. Extrinsic rewards such as money 
presented contingently for intrinsically motivated activities will 
act to increase the salience of the control aspect of reward. The 
perceived locus of causality will become more external resulting in a 
decrement in intrinsic motivation. However, social reinforcement such 
as positive feedback are more salient in informational aspects and will 
act to increase feelings of competence and self-determination. The 
result is increased intrinsic motivation. Negative feedback is salient 
for information but will decrease feelings of competence, thus lowering 
intrinsic motivation (Deci, 19719 1972, 1972a, 1975a).
A crucial issue is that of non-contingent rewards. In the non­
contingent reward situation performance isn’t tied directly to rewards, 
thus decreasing the control aspect of the reward. This situation should 
not have the detrimental effects on intrinsic motivation as in the 
contingent reward situation. Since the theory deals with intrinsically 
motivated activities, Deci (1972b, 1975a) advocates techniques of job 
enlargement and enrichment (e.g., Hackman & Lawler, 1971) to promote 
initial intrinsic motivation. Avoidance of decrements in intrinsic 
motivation may be accomplished using non-contingent pay systems.
6Methodological Techniques
Because the implications of cognitive evaluation theory are so 
divergent from those of reinforcement theory a great deal of research 
has been generated. A brief review of this literature will be presented 
in order to examine the logic leading to the present study.
Deci (19T1) employed a 3-session study with two groups of college 
students involving a cube puzzle called Soma. Soma is made up of 
seven pieces, each consisting of 3 or U 1-inch cubes connected in 
different ways. The pieces may be fitted together to form configura­
tions presented to subjects on drawings. The task is mentally 
challenging and presumed to be intrinsically interesting to college 
students. In each session subjects were asked to solve four puzzles, 
each with a 13-minute time limit.
In all sessions, subjects were seated at a table which had on 
it Soma, a series of task configurations, some extra configurations, 
and some popular magazines. Subjects were informed that the study was 
one testing problem solving ability. In each session, each subject 
tried to solve the task configurations within the time limit. After 
the first two puzzle attempts the experimenter informed the subject 
that the choice of the next two puzzles depended on his performance 
on the first two. The choice was said to require computer aid so 
the subject was.left alone in the room for 10 minutes while the 
experimenter left to compile the data. Subjects were told to 
remain in the room and do anything they wished— read magazines, work 
on the extra configurations, or do nothing. This procedure was a ruse
7designed to obtain measures of intrinsic motivation, operationally 
defined as the amount of time spent on the puzzles during this 10 
minute "free period". Unknown to the subjects, they were being 
watched through a one-way mirror.
The experimenter returned and subjects attempted the last two 
puzzles. In the first session, no subjects were paid, the free 
period indicating baseline measures of intrinsic motivation. In 
the second session subjects in an experimental group were paid one 
dollar for each puzzle they solved within the time limit. The free 
period in this session wasn't analyzed in the data because presumably 
paid subjects would use the time to practice. In the final session 
the experimental subjects were informed that funds for paying subjects 
had been exhausted in the department, so procedures were identical to 
session 1. It should be noted t.hat the configurations available during 
the free period were impossible, to eliminate reduction in free-time 
puzzle solving due to successful completion of all the puzzles. The 
relevant statistical comparison in the study was the difference in 
time spent in free period puzzle solving between sessions 1 and 3. 
Control (non-paid) subjects exhibited no significant difference in 
this measure. However, subjects paid in session 2 showed a considerable 
decrease in session 3 as compared to session 1. Deci interpreted these 
findings as supportive of cognitive evaluation theory. Paying subjects 
contingently was seen to reduce intrinsic motivation for the task, 
resulting in less interest, thus less free time activity on the task.
In 1972 Deci (1972a) employed a 1-session paradigm. The Soma 
puzzle was used and procedures were similar to the initial study
8except that subjects worked on all four puzzles in turn before the 
free period. After completion of this phase subjects were told to 
wait while the experimenter analyzed their performance ah order to 
determine an appropriate questionnaire to be filled out. This ruse 
allowed another experimenter to unobtrusively observe the subject for 
an 8-minute free period. The experimental manipulations in the study 
were contingent or non-contingent rewards, threats of punishment (a 
loud buzzer) for poor performance, positive or negative feedback on 
performance level, and a no-treatment control. The data supported 
cognitive evaluation theory. Subjects verbally reinforced spent more 
time in the free period working with Soma than controls, non-contingent 
subjects were not different from controls, punishment threats acted to 
reduce free period activity relative to controls, and contingent pay 
reduced free period activity.
Methodological Criticisms
The Deci studies (19T15 1972a, 1972b) have received some criticisms 
to which Deci and his colleagues have replied. Calder and Staw (1975a) 
listed a number of methodological criticisms relating to the entire 
series of studies testing cognitive evaluation theory. They pointed 
out that no performance data were reported during the experimental 
(paid or not paid, etc.) sessions, thus differences in performance 
may act as a mediator and affect free time performance. Contingent 
subjects probably increased effort resulting in possible fatigue or 
satiation, thereby reducing free time activity. Calder and Staw (1975) 
also mentioned some contradictory findings (Kruglanski, Friedman, 
and Zeevi, 1971) in which non-contingent rewards reduced intrinsic 
motivation relative to nonpaid controls.
9Deci, Cascio, and Krusell (.1975) attempted to defend the original 
interpretations of the studies noting that there were no significant 
differences in performance during experimental sessions for paid and 
nonpaid subjects. This disclosure would seem to rule out differences 
in paid subjects due to fatigue and satiation. However, Deci et al. 
(1975) did agree that the issue is still in some doubt concerning the 
effects of non-contingent reward relative to non-paid controls.
However, the original contention concerning the effects of contingent 
reward was strongly defended.
Scott (1975) also criticized Deci's (.1971» 1972a, 1972b) inter­
pretations on the same grounds as Calder and Staw (1975a), that no 
performance data were presented for subjects in the experimental 
sessions. His alternative explanation was that subjects who solved 
more puzzles in this session, regardless of pay contingency would 
experience differential conditioning as compared to subjects solving 
fewer puzzles. Within a reinforcement theory framework, those solving 
more puzzles should go on to spend more free period time working 
on the puzzles. In response to this, Deci (1975b) pointed out the 
different methodological framework within which Scott (1975) vas 
reinterpreting the findings. Deci explains behavior according to a 
cognitive framework in which internal events, cognitions, and 
affective states do affect and cause behavior. Reinforcement theory 
employes a functional analysis of behavior, viewing man as a mechanis­
tic being responding differently in different reinforcement situations. 
As such, the interpretations of data will be quite different. In 
regard to Scott’s (1975) methodological critique, Deci pointed out that
10
while solving more puzzles could act to increase feelings of 
competence and thus act to increase intrinsic motivation, this 
effect may have occurred only at the individual level and post hoc 
analysis showed no systematic distribution of such an effect 
across treatment cells. There was a correlation of .lU (non­
significant) between the number of correct solutions in the 
experimental session and amount of time Bpent on the task in the 
free period.
Calder and Staw (1975b) manipulated both intrinsic and extrinsic 
factors as independent variables and measured the effects on depen­
dent variables of intrinsic motivation different from those 
typically employed by Deci. They hypothesized that when a task 
involves high intrinsic interest, introduction of an extrinsic 
reward may lead to the self-perception that one is performing the 
activity to obtain the extrinsic reward, thus decreasing intrinsic 
motivation. However, when a task involves less intrinsic interest 
this self-perception is not expected to apply. In such an instance 
a direct relationship between extrinsic rewards and intrinsic moti­
vation may apply, which would be in support of reinforcement theory.
A task was selected that could be varied along the dimension of 
intrinsic interest. Some subjects built jig-saw puzzles that had 
an attractive picture (high in intrinsic interest) while others 
built puzzles consisting of pieces that had identical shapes as 
the first condition but the pieces were blank. The other manipu­
lation was pay or no pay. The dependent variables were questionnaire
items; one a measure of task satisfaction and the other a measure 
of the amount of time a subject would volunteer to spend in a 
similar (unpaid) study in the future.
The hypotheses were supported— for an interesting task 
ratings of satisfaction decreased and for a non-interesting task 
ratings of satisfaction increased with monetary rewards. The same 
pattern was noted for volunteer time, but the interaction was not 
significant. This is supportive of Deci in that the extrinsic 
reward/intrinsic motivation interaction is predicted explicitly 
for intrinsically rewarding activities.
Lepper and Greene (1975) examined the effects of adult sur­
veillance on children’s subsequent task interest in a natural class­
room setting. Reward expectation was either present or not. It 
was predicted that both surveillance and expectation of reward would 
decrease the level of intrinsic interest in the task. The task 
involved six interesting puzzles. The reward was access to some "very 
fun'1 toys. In the expected reward the toys were within view at the 
end of the table on which the puzzles were presented. Subjects 
were told that the better they performed on the puzzles, the longer 
time they could spend with the toys (a contingent reward). For 
the unexpected reward condition, the toys were hidden behind a 
screen, and presented non-contingently after the puzzle task.
Surveillance was accomplished using a closed circuit T.V. camera 
trained directly on and placed right next to the child. Low
12
surveillance was defined as use of the camera on 1 of the 6 
puzzles; high surveillance was defined as camera use on U of the 
6 puzzles. The dependent measure of subsequent interest in 
the puzzle was obtained 1 to 3 weeks later in an open classroom 
situation in which the puzzles were set out along with the normal 
classroom activities. The results showed main effects for both 
variables. Low surveillance led to a subsequent higher interest 
level (more time spent on the puzzles) than high surveillance. 
Unexpected-noncontingent reward led to a higher interest level 
than expected-contingent reward. The reward effects are directly 
supportive of cognitive evaluation theory. The effects of sur­
veillance are interpretable within the Deci model. Surveillance 
is typically an external control. Where one’s locus of causality 
is shifted to external, the theory predicts a reduction in intrinsic 
motivation.
Ross (1975) varied salience of reward in order to test the 
hypothesis that perceptions of external control are more likely if 
one is provided with a salient reward for an activity. The experi­
menter varied salience of reward by manipulating the conspicuousness 
of the reward. The subjects were children, aged 3 to h. The task 
involved playing a drum. In the high salient reward condition, 
a box containing the reward was placed directly in front of the subject. 
For low salience, the reward was not present, though it was expected. 
I^ollowing this procedure, a free period was offered in which other
13
toys were also present. The drum was played more often and played 
longer "by subjects in the low salience reward condition and a non­
rewarded control. A delayed (^ -*5 weeks later) free period session 
resulted in comparable results for the duration of play dependent 
measure only. The results clarify the parameters of cognitive 
evaluation theory. With increases in the salience of a reward, 
subsequent interest in a task is diminished.
Some studies have yielded data counter to predictions made by 
cognitive evaluation theory. Farr (1976) conducted an experiment 
utilizing elements from Hackman and Lawler’s (1971) Job Characteris­
tics Model. This model lists five core job dimensions: l) task
significance, 2) task identity, 3) task variety, h) feedback, and 
5) autonomy. A job high in these dimensions, according to the model, 
will foster increased motivation and satisfaction. The core job 
dimensions were varied in the following manner: l) low in core
dimensions, 2) high except for feedback, and 3) high in all dimen­
sions. Monetary pay was awarded contingently or non-contingently.
The dependent measures were four measures of intrinsic motivation:
1) subjects’ willingness to volunteer for an extra unpaid session,
2) productivity during this unpaid session, 3) a satisfaction 
questionnaire, and ^) a questionnaire on the locus of causality of 
task motivation. The task involved erector set assemblies, an activity 
in which core job dimensions were easily varied. Analysis of the
data revealed more contingently paid subjects volunteering for an 
extra session than non-contingently paid subjects. This is directly
Ill
counter to the Deci predictions. The volunteer rate for subjects 
experiencing core job dimensions with feedback was not significantly 
greater than that of subjects not receiving feedback. The feed­
back in this study was positive and cognitive evaluation theory 
predicts enhanced intrinsic interest for those with such feedback.
Also, non-contingent pay did not lead to a greater degree of 
internal attributions of performance causality relative to contin­
gent pay, though Deci would predict such a difference. Farr 
speculated that the task may have lacked a high degree of qualities 
leading to intrinsic motivation, thus the contradictory results. 
Furthermore, pay levels were lower than those typically administered
in the Deci studies, which led him to speculate about possible
\
interactive effects of pay level.
In a follow-up study Farr,*Vance, and McIntyre (1971) investi­
gated the possible mediating effects of pay level. The basic 1- 
session paradigm (Deci, 1972a) with the Soma puzzle was used with 
pay awarded contingently or non-contingently. Contingently paid 
subjects received either $.50, $1.00, or $1.50 per puzzle, while 
non-contingently paid subjects received either $1.00, $2.00, or $3.00 
just for participating. The free period dependent measure of intrinsic 
motivation was used along with a satisfaction questionnaire. The 
authors also analyzed performance during the experimental session.
As cognitive evaluation theory predicts, contingently paid subjects 
spent significantly less free period time playing with Soma than non- 
contingently paid subjects. However,, the questionnaire measures of
15
interest revealed different results. There were no significant 
differences among the different pay levels for contingent or
non-contingent groups.
/
Noting a bimodal distribution of free time activity, the 
authors postulated some mediating personality variables to be ' 
investigated in a second study. Moderating on the locus of 
control and self-esteem scales revealed no systematic differences 
in free period activity. The authors performed a post hoc analysis 
.of the data employing a non-parametric statistical test assumed to 
be more appropriate for bimodal data. The data were analyzed to 
see if those subjects who solved more puzzles during the experi­
mental session went on to spend more free time on Soma. However, 
significant relationships were found only for the first study. This 
result offers evidence supporting reinforcement theory, in that 
solving more puzzles is more reinforcing, thus behavior is more 
likely to persist.
Enzle and Ross (1978) tested cognitive evaluation theory, 
concentrating on the salience of the control or competence aspect 
of the reward contingencies. They reasoned that money paid con­
tingent on a skill-related criterion of performance would increase 
the salience of the competence information aspect. Conversely, 
paying subjects simply to perform the task should increase the 
salience of the control aspect of the reward. Furthermore, only 
high reward levels should bring about these changes in salience
16
of the different aspects of reward. This reasoning derives from 
the postulates of cognitive evaluation theory yet the inter­
pretations are different from those of Deci (19719 1972a, 1975a).
The authors predicted that l) subjects receiving high reward 
just for performance of a task (non-contingent) will he less ; 
intrinsically motivated than control subjects getting an unexpected 
payment of equal value, 2) subjects.receiving high payment con­
tingent on a skill related criterion will be more motivated than 
highly paid control subjects receiving unexpected pay, 3) low 
rewarded subjects should demonstrate no differences between condi-t 
tions, and U) there will be main effects due to reward level 
depending on the reward aspect salience. The experimental sessions 
were similar to the Deci (1971, 1972a, 1972b) studies except the 
dependent measures of intrinsic motivation were questionnaire items 
concerning how interesting the puzzle task was and how much a person 
would play with it if he owned it. All predictions were supported. 
High pay for non-contingent performance lowered intrinsic motiva­
tion relative to controls, high pay for criterion contingent 
performance raised intrinsic motivation relative to controls, and 
no differences were exhibited when pay was low.. High pay for 
criterion contingent performance resulted in higher intrinsic moti­
vation level than low pay for this condition. High pay for non-* 
contingent performance resulted in lower intrinsic motivation levels 
than low pay fqr this condition.
IT
Overall, the support for Deci (l971» 1972a, 1975a) has been 
rather extensive yet the disconfinning .studies indicate the necessity 
to further investigate cognitive evaluation theory. The greatest 
antagonists toward the theory have been those proponents of 
reinforcement theory.
Statement of the Problem 
The most damaging evidence counter to cognitive evaluation theory 
has been th&t of Farr, Vance, and McIntyre (19771)* Having failed 
to obtain results predicted by the theory, the authors analyzed the 
data to see if task performance during the experimental session were 
the crucial variable affecting free period task activity. This 
proved to be the case, but for only one of their experiments.
Another important point was the observation of typically bimodal data 
on free period task activity. Many students spent considerable 
free period time working with the task while many spent very little 
time. These authors looked at several studies in the Deci series 
(1971» 1972a, 1972b) and noted the existence of typically bimodal 
data in these. The appropriate statistical procedure for such data 
is non-parametric. When Farr, et al. (1977) analyzed the data from 
the three Deci studies using non-parametric statistics the results 
were non-significant for the 1972a study only.
These discrepancies indicate the need to execute a study that has 
specific differential predictions for cognitive evaluation theory and 
reinforcement theory. The general concensus among supporters of
l8
reinforcement theory is that those performing at higher levels during 
experimental treatment sessions go on to spend more free period 
activity on the task due to persistence resulting from the high 
reinforcement value of high performance (Farr et al., 19775 Scott, 
1975)* While Deci (1975b) has stated that this effect has not 
appeared in his data, he contends that high performance during 
experimental sessions could generate feelings of competence which 
may increase intrinsic motivation. In effect Deci has allowed for 
predictions made by reinforcement theory within the bounds of cog­
nitive evaluation theory. In order to make the predictions discre­
pant, a study would, have to hold constant these feelings of competence 
to see if experimental session performance is the relevant variable 
differentiating free period activity. If feelings of competence 
were held constant and high performers' went on to spend more free 
period activity at the task, such results could not be interpreted 
within a cognitive evaluation theory framework. If pay contingency 
is the important variable, then performance level should have no 
effect and cognitive evaluation theory would be supported.
Though the general argument between Deci and the proponents of 
reinforcement theory is concerned with- the effects of performance 
during test trials, it should.be mentioned that reinforcement theory 
specifically predicts that individuals paid (reinforced) for task 
performance will persist in that task when reward is removed. Thus, 
reinforcement theory predicts that individuals paid during test 
trials will go on to spend more free period time at the task than 
those not being paid.
19
Although Deci (1975a) has stated that high performance will 
generally lead to greater feelings of competence, this may not always 
be the case. Weiner, Freize, Kukla, Reed, Rest, and Rosenbaum (1971) 
have shown that individuals low in achievement motivation have an 
inability ..'to attribute successful performance to internal factors,
t
whereas high achievers tend to view their success as internally 
caused. The only way an individual can experience pride in his 
successful performance is by attributing the outcome to internal 
factors such as ability or effort. It follows that an individual 
will probably not feel competent in a task if he believes that his 
high performance was due to external factors such as task ease or 
luck. Without increased feelings of competence, intrinsic motivation 
will not be enhanced.
Since attributions may mediate feelings of competence, Deci's 
theoretical statements concerning competence may need qualification. 
The present study explored the possible relationships between attri­
butions and feelings of competence to aid in clarifying and inter­
preting any findings concerning performance, competence, and intrinsic 
motivation.
Experimental Design
The present study was designed to separate the predictions made 
by cognitive evaluation theory and reinforcement theory. A pay versus 
no pay variable was included in the design to test the Deci prediction 
that pay for an interesting task would lower intrinsic motivation and 
suppress intrinsically motivated behaviors. A low versus high perfor­
mance variable (achieved by blocking) was included to test the
20
reinforcement hypothesis that successful task performances act as 
reinforcers, thus increasing the probability of similar behavioral 
occurrences. Since cognitive evaluation theory allows for this 
prediction by alluding to increased feelings of competence with 
high performance, a third variable was introduced intended to 
equalize feelings of competence at different levels of performance 
(i.e., at different reinforcement levels). Consequently, the design 
allowed for separating predictions made by cognitive evaluation 
theory and reinforcement theory. In this manner the separate effects 
Of performance and feelings of competence were analyzed. Thus the 
experiment was a 2 (pay/no pay) X 2 (low performance/high performance)
X 2 (competence equalization/no competence equalization) factorial 
design.
Hypotheses
The rewards for task performance in this study were both expected 
and contingent for all paid subjects. Since cognitive evaluation 
theory predicts a decrement in intrinsic motivation for this system 
of payment, it was hypothesized that those receiving pay would go on 
to spend less time at the task during a free period than those not 
getting paid. Paid subjects should also indicate that they enjoyed the 
task less, and would be less willing to volunteer for a similar (unpaid) 
experiment in the future than non-paid subjects.
Deci (1975b) has stated that high performance on a task will lead 
to increased feelings of competence, thus increasing intrinsic motiva­
tion. Therefore, it was hypothesized that high performers would spend 
more free period activity at the task than low performers. It was also
21
predicted that high performers would indicate greater task enjoy­
ment and willingness to participate in the future than low performers.
The competence equalization condition was included in the study 
to modify feelings of competence at different performance levels. 
Cognitive evaluation theory makes no predictions for a variable 
such as this. Therefore, predictions for this manipulation can only 
be stated in terms of how it should modify the hypotheses concerning 
performance. It was hypothesized that differences resulting from 
performance would be found only for subjects in the no competence-, 
equalization condition. Subjects experiencing competence equalization 
should not differ in free period task activity, enjoyment of the task, 
or willingness to repeat a similar experiment in the future as a 
function of performance level.
The greater portion of the Deci studies have dealt with the 
effects of pay (Deci, 1971, 1972b) or positive and negative feedback 
(Deci, 1972a). Since the effects of performance level and competence 
were mentioned incidentally (Deci, 1975b), it may be assumed that 
cognitive evaluation theory views pay as the more potent determinant 
of intrinsic motivation.
Based on the hypotheses, the predictions for the intrinsic moti­
vation dependent variables (free period activity, task enjoyment, and 
willingness to volunteer in the future) may be ordered for the eight 
conditions in the following manner (where P = pay, NP = no pay,
CE = competence equalization, NCE = no competence equalization, Lo = 
low performance, and Hi = high performance): NP, Hi, NCE>NP,
Hi, CE = NP, Lo, CE > NP, Lo, NCE>P, Hi, NCE>P, Hi, CE = P, Lo,
CE > P, Lo, NCE.
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Subjects' attributions of causality for task performance were 
included in the design to aid in clarification and interpretation of 
the results. Therefore, no hypotheses were generated for responses 
to attribution questionnaire items.
Method
Subjects
The subjects were 89 undergraduate female students from the 
University of Nebraska at Omaha. They participated voluntarily in 
order to receive extra credit in undergraduate psychology courses.
Sex has been found to be an important factor in spatial rela­
tions tasks(McGlone & Kertesz, 1973)* Typically males perform 
better at such tasks than females. The task used in the present study 
was the puzzle game Soma, which involves spatial relations. A pilot 
study was performed in order to find a series of puzzles in which 
half the subjects performed well and half performed poorly. Female 
subjects displayed far greater variability in performance level than 
males. Since the use of female subjects appeared to be more conducive 
to blocking by performance, it was decided to use only this sex.
Task
The task employed was the Parker Brothers cube puzzle game called 
Soma. Soma has seven different pieces, each piece made up of 3 or U 
1-inch cubes connected in different patterns. The task involves 
constructing configurations using various combinations of the Soma 
pieces. Stimulus materials consisted of drawings of the configurations 
to be made. There were three different test drawings and a sample 
drawing. In addition, there were two other configurations that were
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insoluble that were available to subjects during a free period.
The study took place in a room equipped with a table and a one-way 
mirror through which the experimenter could observe subjects.
Procedure and Independent Variables
The procedure was very similar to Deci’s (1972a, 1972b) oije- 
session, one subject per’ session paradigm. When, a subject reported 
to the designated area she was met be an experimenter who took her into 
the experimental room and asked her to sit at the table. Then-/she,: was 
presented with a consent form briefly describing the procedures she would 
be experiencing. For half the subjects the consent form indicated that 
she would earn $1.25 for each puzzle successfully solved within a 5- 
minute time limit, while the remaining subjects were not provided with 
any pay information. Those subjects consenting to participate (no 
subjects declined) were asked to sign the form, and the study began.
To the immediate left of the subjects were the three test drawings 
and the sample drawings. To the subject’s right were the additional 
drawings, the insoluble ones. On the far side of the table were recent 
issues of two women’s magazines, Bazaar and Cosmopolitan. In a far corner 
of the room (out of the subject’s seated view) sat a female experi­
mental assistant. During the entire session she appeared busy coding 
data. The presence of this assistant was an ethical consideration. The 
experiment required covert surveillance for an 8-minute period and the 
experimenter did not wish to covertly observe subjects who believed 
themselves to be alone in the room. When later asked what the subjects 
thought of the assistant’s presence, practically all subjects expressed 
the belif that she was either a subject on some other experimental
2b
phase or was helping the experimenter with some aspect of the 
data. During the debriefing stage, no subject indicated that the 
presence of the assistant affected her behavior during any phase 
of the study.
The experimenter then read the instructions. Each subject was 
asked to attempt to solve three separate puzzles, each with a
5-minute time limit. During the instructions the experimenter demon­
strated how puzzles should match the drawing, using the sample 
configuration. Paid subjects were informed of the piece-rate pay 
system and were told that all earnings would be paid in cash 
immediately after the entire session was over.
Subjects than worked on each of the test puzzles in turn with 
the experimenter timing each one. For each puzzle successfully solved 
the experimenter stated, "That's exactly right," and he then recorded 
the solution time. Each paid subject was given a cumulative statement 
of her earnings after each successful solution. With each unsuccessful 
attempt the experimenter said, "That's time," and immediately showed 
the subject the solution. This let subjects know that all test configur' 
ations were possible and helped to eliminate the Ziegarnik effect 
(Ziegarnik, 1927). After all three test puzzles had been attempted, 
the paid subject's were told how much they had earned.
At this point half the subjects received the competence equaliza­
tion (CE) feedback. Despite the performance level, each subject 
receiving CE was told that she performed "about average" in comparison 
with the other subj'ects in the study. For subjects solving few puzzles 
(0—1) the experimenter informed them that this particular series of
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puzzles appeared to be quite difficult and almost everyone had 
performed at the same- level. For subjects solving 2 to 3 puzzles the 
experimenter informed them that this puzzle series was rather easy 
and most had performed at this high level. Subjects in the no 
competence equalization condition were not given feedback of any 
kind.
Next all subjects were told that the final phase of the study 
involved a questionnaire to be completed. Each subject was told that 
a number of different questionnaire forms existed, and that only . 
one was appropriate for that particular subject. To select the most 
appropriate form, data from the test session would be fed into a 
computer terminal. To do this the experimenter would have to leave 
the room for a short time, about 10 minutes. The experimenter told 
each subject, "Please just wait ‘around til I get back. You can do 
whatever you want while I’m gone. There are magzaines to read and 
even extra puzzles if you’d like to play with them." This was a ruse 
designed to leave the subject in the room, free to do whatever she 
liked. In actuality, all questionnaires were identical.
The experimenter then left the room and quietly entered an 
adjacent room with a one-way mirror through which subjects were 
observed. The experimenter started a timer immediately upon first 
sight of the subject. The subject was viewed for eight minutes during 
which a stopwatch was used to record how much of this eight minute 




Intrinsic motivation for the Soma task was defined as the amount 
of time a subject spent working on the task during this free period.
The extra configurations were impossible to solve to avoid the 
possibility that solution of a configuration would influence whether 
or not a subject spent more time working on the puzzles. Dependent 
measures of intrinsic motivation were also included in a questionnaire 
(see Appendix A). Since subjects were led to believe that the study was 
primarily concerned with spatial relations, the first two questionnaire 
items (7-point Likert scales) pertained to problem solving strategies. 
The next two items (also 7-point Likert scales) dealt with intrinsic 
motivation toward the Soma task, one concerned task enjoyment, 
and the other, a query on the willingness of a subject to volunteer 
for a similar experiment in the .future. The fifth item (,7-point 
Likert scale) asked subjects how competent they felt about their per­
formance. This question allowed.for a manipulation check concerning 
one of the independent variables, that of inducing equated feelings 
of competence in half the low and half the high performers. Also 
included in the questionnaire were two series of items concerning 
causal attributions that people typically cite for their task perfor­
mance: l) task difficulty, 2) luck, 3) ability, and U) effort. These
were both 7-point bipolar scales, and subjects' assessment of the 
percent to which each causal factor contributed to their performance.
After the eight minute period the experimenter returned to the 
experimental room with the questionnaire and had subjects fill it out.
2?
Having completed the questionnaire, the pay subjects were given their 
earnings in cash. At this point all subjects were debriefed, asked 
their feelings concerning the study, and thanked for their partici­
pation. The data for one subject had to be dropped because she had





The manipulation check, questionnaire item E (concerning how 
competent subjects felt in their performance), indicated that the 
competence equalization feedback did not induce the intended feelings. 
It was predicted that there should be a significant Performance X CE 
interaction in which low performers with no CE felt rather low in 
competence, high performers with no CE felt rather high in competence, 
and both' low and high performers with CE felt about average in com­
petence. Figure 1 illustrates this predicted interaction.
Insert Figure 1 here
For the item on Competence there was a significant main effect for 
CE, F ^  gjj = 5.^ -lj p<.05* Subjects receiving CE felt more competent 
(M =3.52) than subjects not receiving CE (M = 2.96). This item also 
yielded a significant main effect for Performance, F ^  = 29-93? p<.01. 
High performers indicated that they felt more competent (M = U.03) than 
low performers (M = 2.7)- Figure 2 indicates that for low performers 
the CE manipulation had the intended effect. Low performers administered 






















Figure 1• The Hypothesized Interaction of CE and Performance 
on Feelings of Competence
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However, for high performers CE had no significant effect on 
feelings of competence, t(3^0 = .81, n.s. Administering CE to 
high performers was intended to reduce their feelings of competence 
relative to those not receiving CE.
Insert Figure 2 here
The measure of competence was found to be related to the total 
number of puzzles solved. This was tested by a.one way analysis of 
variance, F(3,^0) = 1 3 . p-'C.OQl. Each successive number of puzzles 
solved resulted in a significant (p<C.05) increase in feelings of 
competence when analyzed by a Newman-Keuls pair-wise procedure: for
no puzzles solved M = 1.92, for one solution M = 2.71» Tor two solu­
tions M = 3.6U, and for three puzzles solved M = 4^.75* This preceding 
analysis was performed only for^subjects not receiving CE, since CE 
systematically raised feelings of competence for low performers. 
Measures of Intrinsic Motivation
For the dependent measure of free time puzzle activity the within 
cell distributions were extremely bimodal, the modal points tending 
to fall at the 0 minute and 8 minute points. The distributions were 
transformed to a more normal shape by the equation: Time = 1/Time + 1.
For this dependent measure no significant differences were obtained.
In an attempt to locate the source of variance for the free time 
variable, the test session puzzle-solving data were regrouped in a new 
manner. It may be recalled that subjects attempted to solve three 
separate puzzles during the test sessions. A number of different per­


















Figure 2: The Joint Effects of CE and Performance on Feelings of Competence
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were displayed. Some subjects solved none of the puzzles. Subjects 
solving only one puzzle of the series displayed three patterns: 
solution of the 1st, the 2nd, or the 3rd puzzle. Subjects solving 
two puzzles either solved the 1st and 2nd, 1st and 3rd, or 2nd and 3rd 
puzzles. Of the 89 subjects, only five solved all three of the puzzles.
Based on these data, three groups were formed for a post hoc 
analysis. One group (n = IT) consisted of subjects who demonstrated 
improvement across the three puzzles. Improvement was defined as 
failure in solving either the 1st, or the 1st and 2nd puzzles, and 
solving the remaining puzzles. A second group (n = 27) was designated 
as a no improvement group, consisting of subjects solving either all or 
none of the puzzles. A third group (n = 20) consisted of subjects 
demonstrating a decrement in performance across the puzzle series. 
Decrement was defined as solving the 1st, or the 1st and 2nd puzzles, 
and not solving the remainder. Certain patterns were displayed that 
could not be assigned to conditions based on the above group defini­
tions. A single solution of the second puzzle or solutions of the 
1st and 3rd puzzles represented patterns that did not meet any of the 
requirements for the above groupings. In this post hoc analysis, data 
for 25 of the 89 subjects were not used.
An analysis of free time activity based on the post hoc groupings 
revealed significant differences, F(2,52) - 3.83, p<C.05. Improving 
subjects spent the greatest amount of time at the task (M = ^.65), 
non-improving subjects were intermediate (M = 2.99)» and subjects 
displaying a decrement spent the least time at the task (M = 1.36).
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Figure 3 graphically displays the linear trend across these con­
ditions. A Newman-Keuls comparison test indicated significant
Insert Figure 3 here
differences "between only the improvement and decrement groups
(p<,05)« The linearity in the free time measure was also evidenced
when separating the non-improvement condition into it's two component
groups, those solving no puzzles and those solving three puzzles. The
analysis of variance statistic was significant, F(2,52) = 2.70,
p<.05» and the test for the linear trend was also significant,
F(2,52) = 2..76, p<.05. The test for the quadratic trend was not
significant at the .05 level, F(2,52)"^  1.00, nor was the cubic trend,
F(2.25)< 1.00. Since the data were not normally distributed, a
2
non-parametric te.st, %  , was als.o applied. This was found to be 
2
significant, %  (2) = 10.00, p<T.01. This analysis confirmed the 
finding that subjects in the Improvement condition spent more time 
on the puzzles in the free period than Decrement subjects. This, 
newly created independent variable did not interact significantly 
with CE or Pay conditions.
For the questionnaire item on task enjoyment there.was a significant 
main effect for performance, F(l,8l) = U.7^, p<C.05* High performers 
tended to enjoy the task (M = 5*53) more than low performers (M = U.68). 
There were no other significant effects for this variable. For the item 
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Figure 3: Free Period Activity Time as a Function of Improvement
In the various studies supportive of Deci (Calder & Staw, 1975b; 
Deci, 1971, 1972a, 1972b) different measures of intrinsic motivation 
were employed (e.g., free period task activity, numerous questionnaire 
items on task interest and enjoyment). If it can be assumed that all 
of these variables measure intrinsic motivation, then the various 
dependent measures should intercorrelate significantly. This was 
found to he only partially supported. It was found that free period 
task activity correlated positively with task enjoyment (r = .22, 
p<.05)s task enjoyment correlated positively with willingness to 
volunteer (r = .5^, p^.OOl), but free period time did not correlate 
with willingness to volunteer (r = .07, n.s.). These data indicate 
the questionable reliability and comparability for the different measures 
of intrinsic motivation used in this and other studies. These and 
other correlations among dependent variables are presented in Appendix 
C.
Causal Attributions
It was initially intended to employ the two separate series of 
attribution items as a reliability check. However, the items dealing 
with percentage attribution of performance to the four causal elements 
presented problems in the context of this experiment. The main problem 
is concerned with the ambiguous meanings of responses as a 
function of different performance levels. For example, a high 
performer attributing a high proportion of causality to ability 
might indicate attributions of high ability whereas a low per­
former attributing this same proportion may be indicating attribu­
tions of low ability. These inconsistencies prohibited the use of the 
two separate series of items as reliability checks on each other.
»
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Furthermore, the data on percentage attribution items are difficult 
to interpret and will, therefore, not be presented in the body of 
this text (see Appendix B for these data).
For-the questionnaire item concerning causal attributions of 
luck there was a significant main effect for performance, F(l,8l) =
J
33.01, p<.001. Low performers tended to make attributions toward 
the bad luck end of the continuum (M = ^.08) whereas high performers 
tended to make attributions toward the good luck end of the continuum 
(M = 3.00). There were no other significant effects for this variable.
For task attributions there was a significant main effect for CE, 
F(l,8l) = 6.9^» p<.01. Subjects receiving CE tended to make attribu­
tions more toward the hard task end of the continuum (M = 3.02) than 
those receiving no CE (.M = 3*58). There was also a significant main 
effect for performance, F(l,8l) y= 7*99» p<.01. Low performers made 
attributions more in the direction of hard task (M = 3.06) than high 
performers (M = 3.67). No other effects were significant.
For effort attributions there was a significant main effect for 
performance, F(l,8l) = 5.53, p<C.05* High performers tended to make 
greater attributions of high effort (M = 5*58) than low performers 
(M = 5.06). There was also a significant triple interaction of 
Pay X CE X Performance, F(l,8l) = 8.35j p<C*01. The test for eta 
squared revealed that 9% of the variance in the dependent variable 
was accounted for by this triple interaction. Figure k illustrates 
the manner in which the three independent variables interacted. There 
were no other significant effects.
Insert Figure U here
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Figure 4: The Interaction of Pay X CE X Performance on Attributions 
of Effort
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For ability attributions there was a significant main effect for
Performance, F(l,8l) = 16.67, p<.001. High performers tended to make
attributions of high ability (M = 3.6U) whereas low performers’ 
attributions were more toward the low ability end of the scale (M = ^.53).
This was the only significant effect for this variable.
Also, a number of attribution items correlated with intrinsic 
motivation items (see Appendix C). For example, those who felt 
competent at the task tended to attribute performance to high ability 
(r = .51, pC.OOl).
Discussion
Due to the failure of the CE manipulation it is difficult to make 
interpretations pertaining to the original hypotheses. However, a 
number of interesting effects were displayed that warrant discussion. ■
Though the CE manipulation .did not have the intended effects 
on feelings of competence, this manipulation did systematically affect 
the competence questionnaire item. As predicted, telling low performers 
that their performance was average increased their feelings of competence. 
However, telling high performers that they were average did not signi­
ficantly affect their feelings of competence, though it would be expected 
to lower these feelings (actually CE acted to elevate feelings of 
competence for high performers slightly, though this difference was not 
significant).
One possible explanation of this phenomenon is differential salience 
of information for high and low performers. For low performers the 
information that they had performed average was salient. In an 
achievement situation such as this it seems likely that subjects wel­
comed information that made their performance seem better than the raw
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score would indicate. For high performers the raw score was the 
salient information. Having solved at least two of the three 
puzzles, the subjects preferred to view themselves as competent 
based on their individual performance, whereas low performing subjects 
were eager to base their competence ratings on their performance 
in relation to others. This explanation assumes that the subjects 
have some degree of achievement motivation. Given the population 
of subjects drawn from, college students who are constantly subjected 
to achievement situations, this explanation seems quite plausible.
The predictions based on cognitive evaluation theory were only 
partially supported, and the failure of the CE manipulation prohibits 
an explanation solely within the framework of the Deci theory. Though 
the three measures of intrinsic motivation correlated somewhat, the 
pay condition was found to be unrelated to any of these. This finding 
agrees with other studies (Farr et al., 1977) that are nonsupportive of 
cognitive evaluation theory.
The hypotheses that high performers would exhibit higher levels 
of intrinsic motivation than low performers was supported, but only for 
the questionnaire item on enjoyment of the task. The. explanation for 
this effect based on cognitive evaluation theory would be that high 
performers felt more competent at the task, and as a result, displayed 
greater levels of intrinsic motivation. While it is true that high 
performers felt more competent than low performers, there are other 
possible explanations of the effect of performance level on enjoyment. 
Since feelings of competence at different performance levels and 
differential reinforcement are confounded, a reinforcement explanation
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is just as likely. Reinforcement theory predicts that paid subjects 
would to on to spend more free period time at the task than non­
paid subjects due to persistence after a conditioning session. This 
effect was not evidenced in the data.
The post hoc analysis of the free period activity data offers 
some basis upon which to explain the variability in this measure.
Though the distinctions in the groups were labelled as an improvement 
difference, they may be seen as differences in scheduling of reinforce­
ments. The "improve" condition represents a period of non-reinforce­
ment followed by reinforcement, and the free period may be thought of as 
an extinction period in which no rewards are presented for performance.
The "decrement" group may be seen as an initial reinforcement period 
followed by extinction (the remaining unsuccessful trials and the free 
period). The non-improvement group was not found to be significantly 
different from the other two more extreme groups, so only those need 
to be mentioned.
Capaldi (1967) has developed a sequential hypothesis pertaining to 
schedules of reinforcement and their relation to resistence to extinction. 
In it's simplest form the theory states that organisms experiencing 
non-rewarded trials followed by rewarded trials (labelled N-R transi­
tions) exhibit the greatest degree of resistance to extinction. Capaldi’ 
explains that organisms experiencing this N-R sequence become conditioned 
to responding in the presence of non-reward and are thus more likely 
to persist during extinction than those undergoing other sequences, 
especially an R-N sequence. The extreme two groups represent the two 
most pure forms of this sequence, the "improve" group being the N-R 
transition and the "decrement" group, the R-N transition. The results
bo
of this study could have been predicted on the basis of Capaldi's 
theory: The N-R group ("improve") vent on to persist.in the behavior
during extinction and the R-N group ("decrement") displayed little 
resistance to extinction. It should be emphasized that Capaldifs theory 
is a reinforcement theory.
Since this analysis is made post hoc, an extended exploration 
into the intracacies of the sequential hypothesis hardly seems 
■warranted. It is possible that alternative explanations based on a cog­
nitive viewpoint could also be applied. Of greater relevance, in view 
of the questions asked at the outset, is the finding that only perfor­
mance differences can be found to account for differences in any 
variable assumed to measure intrinsic motivation. This is fairly 
strong evidence nonsppportive of Deci since this theory deals primarily 
with pay and informational feedback. Differences due to performance 
were only casually mentioned in response to the damaging evidence by 
Farr et al. (1977).
Another post hoc analysis was performed concerning the relationship 
between competence and free period task activity. As mentioned earlier 
competence was found to be a direct function of the number of puzzles 
solved, where CE was not delivered. There were no differences in time 
spent in the free period as a function of the number of puzzle solutions, 
F(3,Uo)*C 1.00. As reported earlier, free period activity was found to 
be related to the sequence of puzzle solutions. An analysis of 
variance was performed to test the differences in feelings of competence 
at different levels of improvement (i.e., sequence differences). The 
statistic was significant, F(3,29) = 12.36, p<.001. However, the
Ul
differences in competence based on improvement level, vere not linear, 
as the differences in free time activity vere (see Figure 5)* Feelings 
of competence did not increase vith schedules more conducive to persistence. 
Therefore, it appears that tvo separate and independent mechanisms vere 
operating. The persistence (free period activity) data seem i^ o reflect 
an operant scheduling mechanism, vhereas feelings of competence may 
have a more cognitive orientation, based on the number of puzzle 
solutions.
Insert Figure 5 here
This study may also demonstrate inadequacies in the apparatus usually 
employed by Deci. Of the 89 subjects, 56 spent no free period activity 
vith Soma. This vould not be expected if the task vere intrinsically 
motivating to begin vith. Since cognitive evaluation theory only applies 
to tasks that are intrinsically interesting, any predictions made vhere 
Soma is the activity may not be applicable. There exists the possibility 
that differences in the subject population could account for the present 
lack of evidence of the enjoyability of Soma. To eliminate any doubt, 
hovever, it is recommended that the activity to be measured be validated 
as intrinsically interesting. Lepper et al. (1973) accomplished this 
by selecting subjects vho demonstrated an initial interest in the activity.
The data on subject's attributions is mostly consistent vith findings 
from other studies. Weiner et al. (1971) have stated that subjects may 
look at their performance outcome to infer various causes of their 
performance. This notion is consistent vith the self-perception 





















0 Solutions 3 Solutions Improvement
Figure 5s The Effects of Puzzle Solution Sequence on 
Feelings of Competence
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results in attributions of bad luck, a self-defensive response. This 
is consistent with the present findings. Also consistent with Weiner 
were the findings that successful performance brings about greater 
attributions of high effort and ability than unsuccessful performance.
Other data on attribution items seem to further illustrate* the 
achievement motivation differences in females and males. Feather and 
Simon (197*0 found that females tend to take little personal credit 
for success and often attribute failure to low ability. They accounted 
for these findings by citing socialization experiences common to 
women. The present study found that successful female performers had 
a tendency to attribute their performance to, among other things, an 
easy task and good luck, both external factors. In addition, low 
performers believed their.performance to be due, in part, to low 
ability.
Despite the special attributions that women often make, many of the. 
relationships found are indicative of achievement motivation. Weiner 
et al. (l97l) defines achievement motivation as the capacity for 
perceiving success as caused by internal factors. In the present 
study successful performance was perceived to be due, among other 
things, to ability and effort. Those perceiving this relationship 
felt competent at the task and enjoyed it, an indication that they 
felt pride due to the internally attributed causations of their success.
In summary, performance, not pay, seems to be the main variable 
accounting for differences in this study. Furthermore, it is 
questionable whether any findings can* be used as supportive or non- 
supportive of cognitive evaluation theory due to the use of a task that 
may not be initially intrinsically motivating.
kk
Any replication of this experiment vould have to overcome the 
problem of differential salience of information occurring for subjects 
in the CE condition. This might be accomplished by increasing the 
difficulty of the task. For example, if nine puzzles could be presented 
with a difficulty factor such that only about five could maximally 
be solved, the experimenter could define high performance as 3, U or 
5 solutions and low performance as 0, 1, or 2 solutions. In this 
ambiguous situation a subject solving as many as five puzzles would 
not have salient information on his or her performance based solely on 
the proportion of solutions. Higher performers in this type of task 
would probably be more susceptible to feedback information of average 
performance. Also, as indicated earlier, an experiment such as this 
may be more successful if a more enjoyable task is selected, preferrably 
one not involving spatial relations so that males and females could be 
tested.
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Appendix A
Questionnaire
Please answer the following questions by checking the number which indicates how 
you feel.
A) Did you attempt solutions by trying to fit pieces by trial and error?

















Did you attempt to plan strategics for solutions by first looking at the 
pieces and then thinking about how they might fit together?



















Did you enjoy working with the puzzles?

















Would you be willing to volunteer for a future experiment dealing with 
these puzzles in which you will neither get experimental credit or money;

















How competent did you feel you were in solving the puzzles?
















The following items pertain to your performance in the 3 initial puzzles: Place 
a check mark (/) in the space which best represents your evaluation.
I think my performance was due to:
Good Luck :________ :_______  :__________ :_________ :_________ :_____ .: Bad Luck
Hard Task : :_________ :_________ ;_________ :__________: Easy Task
Lack of Effort : : :_________ :_________ :_________ :__________: High Effort
High Ability :________ :__________ :_________ :_________ :_________ :__________: Lack of Ability
Below are four factors that may have contributed to your performance in attempting 
the puzzles. Assume that 100% of your performance can be accounted for by these factors. 
Please assign percentages to each of these. BE SURE THAT THE SUM OF THESE PERCENTAGES 
EQUAL 100%. Luck % Ability % Effort % Task Difficulty %
TOTAL = 100%
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Analysis of Variance Summary for Time Spent 









Total 88 lU. 9U 0.17
Pay 1 0.09 ' 0.09 < 1.00
CE 1 0.16 0.16 <1.00
Performance 1 0. 01 0.01 < 1.00
Pay X GE 1 0.00 0.00 <1.00
Pay X Perf 1 0.26 0.26 1.1+8
CE X Perf 1 0.03 0.03 <1.00
Pay X CE X Perf 1 0.06 0.06 <1.00
Residual 8l lh.3b 0.17
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Analysis of Variance Summary Table for Time Spent 









Total 63 81*1.77 13.36
Improve 2 100.23 50.11 3.83'
Pay 1 0. 00 0. 00 <.1.00
CE 1 3.70 3.70 < 1.00
Improve X Pay 2 5.73 2.89 < 1.00
Improve X CE 2 16.63 8.31 < 1.00
Pay X CE 1 0.78 0.78 <1.00
Improve X Pay X CE 2 '29.33 11. 66 1.12
Residual 52 680.99 13.10
*p_< .05
52










Total 88 298.99 3. b0
Pay 1 3.3b 3.3b < 1.00
CE 1 i . k o l.bO < 1.00
Performance 1 0.03 0.03 < 1.00
Pay X CE 1 0.30 0.30 <1.00
Pay X Perf 1 1.19 1.19 -c 1.00
CE X Perf 1 2.72 2.72 <1.00
Pay X CE X Perf 1 0.17 0.17 <1.00
Residual 81 290.00 3.58
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Total 88 156.0U 1.77
Pay 1 1.8U 1.8U l.UU .
CE 1 6.93 6.93
Performance 1 38.29 38.29 29.93*
Pay X CE .1 U.JlI h.ll 3.21
Pay X Perf 1 0.16 0.16 < 1.00
CE X Perf 1 1.39 1.39 1.09
Pay X CE X Perf 1 ' 0.36 0.36 ^ 1.00
Residual 81 103.65 1.28
*£< .001 
**£ < . 05
5k










Total 88 90.1+9 1.03
Pay l 0.1+7 0.1+7 < 1.00
CE 1 0.1+0 0.1+0 < 1.00
Performance l 25.00 25.00 33.01*
Pay X CE 1 0.11 0.11 1.02
Pay X Perf 1 0.55 0.55 < 1.00
CE X Perf 1 0.09 0.09 <1.00
Pay X CE X Perf 1 ' 2.07 2.07 2.73
Residual 81 61.3I+ 1.03
*£ < . 001
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Total 88 100.81 1.15
Pay 1 0.03 0.03 < 1.00
CE 1 7* 00 7.00 6.91**
Performance 1 8.06 8.06 7.99*
Pay X CE 1 0.30 0.30 <1.00
Pay X Perf 1 0. 02 0. 02 < 1.00
CE X Perf 1 3.15 3.15 3.12
Pay X CE X Perf 1 0.71 0.71 < 1.00
Residual 81 81.72 1.01
*£ < . 01
56










Total 88 111.53 1.27
Pay 1 0.39 0.39 < 1.00
CE 1 2.92 2.92 2.69
Performance 1 6.00 6.00 5.53*
Pay X CE 1 ' 3.25 3.25 3.00
Pay X Perf 1 2.00 2.00 l.Qk-
CE X Perf 1 0.06 0.06 < 1.00
Pay X CE X Perf 1 . 9.05 9.05 8.35**
Residual 8l '87.8U 1.08
*£ < . 05 
**£ < . 01
57










Total 88 10U.^7 1..19
Pay 1 0.16 0.16 <1.00
GE 1 0.U8 0.U8 < 1.00
Performance 1 17.02 17.02 16.67*
Pay X CE 1 0.U6 0.U6 < 1.00
Pay X Perf 1 0.30 0.30 < 1.00
CE X Perf 1 1.56 1.58 1.53
Pay X CE X Perf 1 1.93 1.93 1.89
Residual 8l 82.72 1.02
*£<.001
58












Total 88 3.21 o.oU
Pay 1 0.02 0.02 <  1.00
CE 1 0.00 0.00 <1 1.00
Performance 1 0.20 0.20 5-9^*
Pay X CE 1 ' 0.02 0.02 < 1.00
Pay X Perf 1 0.01 0.01 < 1.00
CE X Perf 1 0.06 0.06 1.89
Pay X CE X Perf 1 0.17 0.17 5.13*
Residual 81 2.73 0.03
*£.<•05
59










Total 88 1.2k 0.02
Pay 1 0.02 0.02 1. 51
CE 1 0.08 0.08 5.73*
Performance 1 0.00 0.00 <1.00
Pay X CE 1 0.00 0.00 <1.00
Pay X Perf 1 0.00. 0.00 <1.00
CE X Perf 1 0.00 0.00 <1.00
Pay X CE X Perf 1 0.01 0.01 <1.00
Residual 8l 1.12 0. 01
*£<. 05
6 o
Analysis of Variance Summary Table for









Total 88 305.95 3.1+8
Pay 1 5.35 5.35 1.57
CE 1 2.8U 2.81+ 1.00
Performance 1 16.13 16.13 1+. 7I+*
Pay X CE 1 0.66 0.66 < 1.00
Pay X Perf 1 1+.81 I+.81 1.1+2
CE X Perf 1 1.1+3 1.1+3 <1.00
Pay X CE X Perf 1 0.00 0.00 <1.00
Residual 81 275.58 3.1+0 <1.00
*£< .05
6l
Analysis of Variance Summary for
% Effort Attribution
Source of Degrees of Sum of Mean
Variance Freedom Squares Square F
Total 88 1.7^ 0.02
Pay 1 0.03 0.03 1 . 38
CE 1 0.0^ 0.0U 2.09
Performance 1 0,02. 0.02 l . .16
Pay X CE 1 0.00 0.00 < 1.00
Pay X Perf 1 0.01 0.Q1 < 1.00
CE X Perf .1 ' 0.00 0.00 < 1.00
Pay X CE X Perf 1 0.01 0,01
•
< 1.00
Residual 81 1.62 0.02
62










Total 88 2.81 0.03
Pay 1 0.02 0.02 < 1.00
CE 1 0.01 0.01 < 1.00
Performance 1 O.UU 0.UU 16.1U*
Pay X CE 1 0.02 0.02 < 1.00
Pay X Perf 1 0.00 0.00 < 1.00
CE X Perf 1 0. oU 0.0U 1.25
Pay X CE X Perf 1 - 0.06 0.06 2.03
Residual 81 2.23 0.03
*£<.001
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Pearson Correlation Coefficients 
Among Dependent Variables
Time Enjoy Volunteer Competence
Time 1.00 .22 .07 -.0^
Enjoy .22* 1.00 .5*+* .1+7*
Volunteer .•07 . 5^* 1.00 .22*
Competence -.oU .ii7* .22* 1.00
Luck .03 -.19 .00 -.1+3*
Task -.lk .16 .lU .17
Effort .08 . ^3* .17 .23
Ability • 19 -.21* -.19 -.51*
% Luck
- 10/
. 16 .07 .29*
% Ability .03 -.25 -.13 -.11
% Effort .07 .38* .13 .2l+*
% Task .03 -.31* -.09 -. 1+2*
* p < . 05
Luck Task Effort Abili
Time .03 -.14 .08 • 19
Enj oy -*19 .16 .43* -.21*
Volunteer .00 .14 .17 -.19
Competence -.43* .17 .23* -.51*
Luck 1.00 -.14 -.22* .28*
Task -.14 1.00 -.11 -.03
Effort -.22* -.11 1.00 -.29*
Ability .28* -.03 -.29* 1.00
% Luck -.38* .25* -.03 -.22*
% Ability .16 .21* -.14 .06
% Effort -.14 .06 .35* .16
% Task 
*p <. 05
.41* -.46* -.15 .32*
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% Luck % Ability % Effort % Task
Time -.10 .03 .06 .03
Enjoy. .16 -.25* .38* -.31*
Volunteer .07 -.13 .13 -.09
Competence .29* -.11 .21** -.1*2*
Luck -.38* .16 -.13 .1*1*
Task .25* .21* .06 -. 1*6*
Effort -.03 -.lU .3^* -•15.
Ability -.22* . 06 -.16 .32*
.% Luck 1.00 - . UU* -.21* -.61*
% Ability 1.00 -.22* -.02
% Effort -.21* -.22* 1.00 -.1*2*













Pay, no CE 
High 
Performance
(n = 9) (n = lb) (n = 9)
Time 3.53 (U.19) 2.38 3.70) 2. b5 (3.72)
Enjoy 6.00 (1.66) U.93 2.2U) 6.11 (1.27)
Volunteer 5. T9 (1.39) 5-07. 2.06) b.Q9 (1.69
Competence b.22 (1.56) 2.93 l.bb) b.22 (0.83)
Luck 3.00 (1.00) b.00 1.0b) 2.67 (1.00)
Task 3.79 (.1.20) 2.57 .0.9b) 3.56 (0.88)
Effort 5-79 (.1.20) 5.6b 0.93) 5.89 (0.60)
Ability U.00 (.0.87) b.21 0.98) 3.33 (0.71)
% Luck 0.22 (0.27) 0.18 0.22) 0.29 (0.16)
% Ability 0.18 (0.10) 0.16 0.11) 0.22 (0.10)
% Effort 0.38 (0.18) 0.32 0.15) 0.33 (0.10)
% Task 0.21 (.0.16) 0.3b 0.18) 0.16 (0.07)
Note: Parenthetical values are standard deviations.

















No Pay, CE, 
High 
Performance
No Pay, CE 
Low 
Performance
No Pay, No 
CE, High 
Performance
No Pay, No 
CE, Low 
Performance
(n = 9) (n = 12) (n - 9) (n - 12)
Time 1.77 (3.05) 3.U7 (3.66) 2.05 3.21) 2 .7** 3.90)
Enjoy 5.11 (1.69) 5.00 (1.65) 0 8 9 1.96) ' U.25 1.71)
Volunteer U.89 (1.5*0 h. 83 (1.99) 1*.M* 2.2*0 U.92 1.68)
Competence U.ll (0.60) 3.25 (1.29) 3.56 0.88) 1.92 1.00)
Luck 2.79 (0.83) U.08 (0.67) 3.56 0.73) U.08 1.00)
Task 3.UU (0.73) 2.67 (1.07) 3.89 l.**5) 3.50 0.90)
Effort 5.67 (1.00) U.83 (0.9*0 5.00 l.Ul) 5. b2 0.90)
Ability 3.**** (0.73) *+. 50 (0.67) 3.78 1.6**) **.75 1.1*0
% Luck 0.36 (0.20) 0.09 (0.10) 0.15 0.11) 0.18 0.18)
% Ability 0.19 (0.08) 0.19 (0.09) 0.29 0.06) 0.25 0.13)
% Effort 0.30 (0.12) 0.33 (0.1**) 0.29 0.10) 0.25 0.18)
% Task 0.15 (0.15) 0.39 (0.11) 0.27 0.18) 0.32 0.18)
Note: Parenthetical values are standard deviations
